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Abstract
Male and female labor are imperfect substitutes and some sectors are more suitable
for female employment than others. Clearly, expansions of those sectors that use female
labor intensively must aﬀect aggregate female labor force participation (FLFP). We
suggest that FLFP actually drops when trade and international specialization expand
sectors that use female labor intensively. This eﬀect arises because expansions of the
former sectors come along with contractions of others. The latter contractions, in turn,
induce male workers to move to the expanding sectors, driving female workers out of
formal employment. Thus, a country that is exporting female labor content is actually
substituting male labor for female. Finally, building on U.S.-Mexican trade data, we
provide empirical evidence that support our argument.
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1 Introduction
World trade volumes have increased secularly during the last century. From 1870 to 1998
growth in world trade has quadrupled growth in world income (Maddison (2001)). Another
signiﬁcant feature of the twentieth century was the increase in female labor force participa-
tion. The participation of married women in the U.S. labor market has been increasing from
around 2% in 1880 to over 70% in 2000 (Fern´ andez (2007)).
The focus of this study is to understand channels through which two major economic fac-
tors, international trade and female labor force participation, are linked. Our main concern
is to show how diﬀerences in capital labor ratios across economies, via international special-
ization, aﬀect the trade-oﬀ in household decisions between fertility and female labor force
participation and how these decisions, in turn, feed back on growth rates of per household
capital stocks.
Our theory relies on an assumption concerning labor supply that is consistent with empir-
ical regularities: male workers have relative advantage in brawn intensive tasks and female
workers have relative advantage in brain intensive tasks. More precisely, we assume that
females and males have equal quantities of brains, but males have more brawn. As a direct
consequence, males’ wages are higher than females’ wages as long as brawn is a valued in-
put.1 Indeed, Figure 1 shows that the wage ratio between female workers and male workers
in the U.S. is less than one during the period 1800-1990.
Assumptions two and three characterize the labor demand of our model. Thus, child-
rearing is assumed to require time that cannot be spent working so that the opportunity
cost of raising children is proportional to the market wage.2 Therefore, given that males and
females are equally productive in raising children, women with the lower market wage raise
children.
1O’Neill (2003)shows that there is still a 10 diﬀerential in female and male wages in the U.S. in 2000,
that is still unexplained by gender diﬀerences in schooling, actual experience and job characteristics.
2Goldin (1995)provides evidence that shows that few women in the 1940’s and 1950’s birth cohorts were
able to combine childbearing with strong labor-force attachment. Angrist and Evans (1998)and Bailey
(2006)ﬁnd a negative causal eﬀect running from fertility to female labor force participation.3
According to our third assumption physical capital complements brains more than brawn.
In combination with the diﬀerence in endowments of brains and brawn between male and
female workers, the last assumption implies that male labor and female labor are imperfect
substitutes.3 Moreover, as economies accumulate physical capital, the rewards to brains
increase relative to brawn and the gender wage gap declines. Indeed, Goldin (1990) writes:
The labor market’s rewards for strength, which made up a large fraction of earn-
ings in the nineteenth century, ought to be minimized by the adoption of ma-
chinery, and its rewards for brain power ought to be increased (𝑝. 59).
To formalize our three assumptions, we adopt the model of Galor and Weil (1996) and
generalize it to a trade setting. Based on the intrinsic diﬀerences in labor endowments be-
tween the sexes we distinguish between a brain intensive sector, which we label “females’
relative advantage sector” (FRAS) and a brawn intensive sector, or “males’ relative advan-
tage sector”(MRAS).
Within this framework, we analyze how female labor force participation is aﬀected by
an expansion or a contraction in a sector that intensively uses female labor. As a result
of international trade, some economies specialize in FRAS, which expands on the expense
of MRAS, while the opposite pattern displays in other economies. Interestingly, our theory
suggests that expanding FRAS hinders female labor force participation, while expanding
MRAS generates the mirror image.
The intuition of this seemingly paradoxical result runs along the following lines. First,
men have higher wages and, therefore, are always formally employed. Second, when an
economy specializes on the FRAS, the MRAS contracts and male workers move to the FRAS
sector. Third, the inﬂow of male workers to the FRAS, depresses the capital-labor ratio in
this sector. Thus, given the relatively strong complementarity between physical capital and
3Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004)have utilized the large positive shock to demand for female labor
induced by World War II to understand the eﬀect of an increase in female labor supply on females’ and
males’ wages. They ﬁnd that a 10% increase in female labor input decreases females’ wages by about
7% − 8%, but reduces males’ wages by only 3% − 5%. This suggests that the elasticity of substitution
between female and male labor ranges between 2.5a n d3 .5.4
brains, the marginal productivity of brains drops by more than the marginal productivity of
brawn, consequently increasing the wage gap. Finally, the increase in the wage gap depresses
female labor force participation.
Simplifying this mechanism, it can be said that, by moving from MRAS to FRAS, male
workers “drive female workers out” of formal employment. Conversely, under specialization
on the MRAS, male workers withdraw from FRAS, which “opens job opportunities” for
women and fosters female labor force participation.
Our mechanism also applies in the case of technological progress, which is biased to-
wards female labor. In particular, technological progress biased towards FRAS increases the
wages in this sector. This increase in wages attracts male workers who leave the MRAS,
an eﬀect that can be strong enough to drive female workers out of formal employment. In
this way, technological progress biased towards female labor might curb female labor force
participation.4
The dynamics of our two-country model are aﬀected by three basic elements from trade
and demographic theory. First, in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, the relative endowments of
production factors, physical capital, and labor, determine specialization patterns. Second,
specialization patterns aﬀect the gender wage gap. Third, the gender wage gap aﬀects house-
hold choice of female labor force participation and fertility. These choices, in turn, impact
household savings and population growth, which, ﬁnally, determine the per-household cap-
ital stock for the subsequent generation. Adding the complementarity assumption between
physical capital and female labor described above, it is the capital abundant economy which
specializes in the FRAS and vice versa.
Thus, our model suggests that international trade enhances growth of per-household
capital in the capital scarce economy by fostering its female labor share and decreasing its
fertility rates at the same time. The impact of trade on the capital abundant economy,
4For the role of technological progress in explaining the demographic transition see Galor and Weil ((1999),
(2000)) and Galor and Moav (2002). For the impact of technological progress on fertility and female labor
force participation see Greenwood and Seshadri (2005)and Doepke, Hazan and Maoz (2007) .5
however, is ambiguous. While international trade hinders female labor force participation
and increases fertility, these adverse eﬀects on per-household capital accumulation may or
may not be dominated by the positive eﬀects through the gains from trade. In either case,
our model suggests that trade cannot accelerate capital accumulation in the rich country by
more than it accelerates it in the poor country and, thus, our theory predicts convergence
of per-household capital stocks.
The model connects to various strands in the literature. The work connecting inter-
national trade and labor markets typically analyzes the impact of trade on unemployment
and labor reallocation (e.g., Davis (1998), Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) and Helpman and
Itskhoki (2007)). Related articles reveal labor market friction as a determinant of compara-
tive advantage and international trade (Saint-Paul (1997), Cunat and Melitz (2007)). Other
scholars investigate whether to include labor market standards in trade agreements (Brown
(2001) and Bagwell and Staiger (2001)). The link between trade, the gender wage gap and
female labor force participation, however, is understudied. A noteworthy exception is Becker
(1957) who argues that trade increases competition among ﬁrms and, thus, reduces costly
discrimination and closes the gender wage gap. Tests of this hypothesis have generally pro-
duced mixed support (see Black and Brainerd (2004), Hazarika and Otero (2004), Berik,
van der Meulen and Zveglich (2004) for some of the scarce empirical investigations). Our
mechanism, in contrast, operates through the diﬀerential demand for gender labor across
sectors and international specialization under perfectly competitive goods and factor mar-
kets.
A diﬀerent literature addresses the reduction in the gender wage gap and the increase
in women’s labor force participation has been the subject of much debate. Welch (2000),
Gosling (2003) and Black and Spitz-Oener (2007) focus on the role of primary attributes.
While Welch (2000) and Gosling (2003) attribute the reduction in the gender wage gap
to the expansion in the value of brains relative to brawn, Black and Spitz-Oener (2007)
addresses the importance of the relative increases in non-routine analytic tasks and non-6
routine interactive tasks, which are associated with higher skill levels.5 Our paper is close
to this literature by taking primary attributes as the source of the gender wage gap.
The link between women’s relative wages and fertility is fairly well established.6.I no u r
framework, the pure eﬀect of an increase in household income, holding the price of children
constant, is to raise the demand for children. If all child-rearing are done by females, an
increase in females’ wages raises both household income and the price of children, and thus
has oﬀsetting income and substitution eﬀects on the demand for children.7 In our model, if
both males’ and females’ wages proportionately increase, then the substitution eﬀect driven
by the increase in the cost of raising children negates the income eﬀect and leaves fertility
unchanged. In such a framework, closing gender wage gap causes fertility to decline.8
There is little research on the links and interactions between demography and inter-
national trade. Closest to our argument is Galor and Mountford (2008) who endogenize
educational choice and fertility choice, arguing that the gains from trade are channeled to-
wards population growth in non-industrial countries while in industrial countries they are
directed towards investment in education and growth in output per-capita.9 Our theory pre-
dicts the opposite eﬀect: trade reduces fertility in developing countries and enhances capital
accumulation and growth of income per-capita, simultaneously highlighting its impact on
female labor force participation.
To advance our understanding of how trade aﬀects female labor force participation quan-
titatively, we test our theory using bilateral trade data for the U.S. (the rich economy) and
5See also Mulligan and Rubinstein (2005)who attribute the reduction in the gender wage gap to a positive
selectivity bias and Fern´ andez (2007)who addresses the role of culture and learning. For gender wage gap
in the U.S., see Goldin (1990)and for the evolution of female labor force participation, see Goldin (2006) .
6The analysis of fertility in the context of relative wages dates back to Becker (1960)and Mincer (1963)
7Pencavel (1986)ﬁnds a positive association between fathers’ labor supply and the number of children.
This is consistent with our framework assuming that fathers’ wage has a pure income eﬀect on the number
of children.
8For a comprehensive discussion on the demographic transition see Galor (2005).
9Their theory suggests that international trade enhanced the specialization of industrial economies in the
production of skill intensive goods. The increase in demand for skilled labor induced an investment in the
quality of the population, expediting demographic transition, stimulating technological progress and further
enhancing the comparative advantage of these industrial economies in the production of skill intensive goods.
Thus, the pattern of trade enhances the initial pattern of comparative advantages and disadvantages.7
Mexico (the poor economy). Central to our estimation strategy is the observation that the
surge in bilateral trade volumes over the period 1990-2007 was uneven across the 51 U.S.
states. For example, trade with Mexico increased by almost 3.2 percent of total output for
Texas, while for New York the increase was 0.1 percent of total output. We exploit this cross-
state variation in the exposure to trade with Mexico to examine how trade has impacted
female labor force participation. Instrumenting trade shares with geographic distance, our
cross-state regressions support the hypothesis that, in rich economies, international trade
with poor countries tends to reduce female labor supply. These ﬁndings are robust to vari-
ous deﬁnitions of female labor supply and a set of controls.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes our argument, section
3 provides an empirical evidence and section 4 presents some concluding remarks. Figures
and tables appear at the end.
2 The Model
In our modeling strategy we follow Galor and Weil (1996) by adopting a standard OLG
model with endogenous choice of fertility.
At time 𝑡 the economy is populated by 𝐿𝑡 households, each containing one adult man
(a husband) and one adult woman (a wife). Individuals live for three periods: childhood,
adulthood and old age. In childhood, individuals consume a ﬁxed quantity of their parents’
time. In adulthood, individuals raise children, supply labor to the market, and save their
wages. In old age, individuals merely consume their savings. The capital stock in each period
is equal to the aggregate savings of the previous period.
A key assumption is that men and women diﬀer in their labor endowments. While men
and women have equal endowments of mental labor units, men have more physical labor units
than women. These diﬀerences translate into a gender wage gap, which, in turn, governs the
trade-oﬀ between female labor force participation and fertility.8
2.1 Production
2.1.1 Technologies
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Intermediate goods are produced using three factors: capital 𝐾, physical labor 𝐿𝑝,a n d
mental labor 𝐿𝑚. We want to reﬂect the fact that sectors vary in their factor intensity, in
particular, in their intensity of mental and physical labor. This, in turn, generates diﬀerences
in demand for male and female labor across sectors. Thus, we impose the following structure
on production of intermediate goods10
𝑋1 = 𝑎𝐾𝗼
𝑡 (𝐿𝑚







Here, the variables 𝐿
𝑝
𝑖,𝑡 stand for the physical labor employed in sector 𝑖 at time 𝑡, while 𝐿𝑚
𝑡
is the amount of mental labor in the ﬁrst sector at time 𝑡.
2.1.2 Labor Supply
Men and women are equally eﬃcient in raising children. On the labor market, however,
each woman supplies one unit of mental labor 𝐿𝑚 while men supply one unit of mental
labor 𝐿𝑚 plus one unit of physical labor 𝐿𝑝. Thus, as long as physical labor has a positive
price, men receive a higher wage than women and therefore the opportunity cost of raising
children is higher for a man than for a woman. Consequently, men only raise children when
women are doing so full-time. Finally, we assume that male workers cannot divide mental
and physical labor and must allocate both units to one sector. This means, in particular,
10As shown in an earlier version of this paper, assuming that physical capital is a production factor of 𝑋2
does not change the spirit of our results.9
that men employed in the 𝑋2-sector waste their mental endowment.
2.2 Preferences
Individuals born at 𝑡 − 1 form households in period 𝑡 and derive utility from the number of
their children 𝑛𝑡 and their joint old-age consumption 𝑐𝑡+1 of a ﬁnal good 𝑌 according to11
𝑢𝑡 = 𝗾 ln(𝑛𝑡)+( 1− 𝗾)ln(𝑐𝑡+1). (3)
It is assumed that parents’ time is the only input required to raise children and thus the
opportunity cost of raising children is proportional to the market wage. Let 𝑤𝐹
𝑡 and 𝑤𝑀
𝑡 be
the hourly wage of female and male workers, respectively. Normalizing the hours per period
to unity, the full income of a household is 𝑤𝑀
𝑡 + 𝑤𝐹
𝑡 , which is spent on consumption and
raising children. Further, let 𝑧 be the fraction of the time endowment of one parent that
must be spent to raise one child. If the wife spends time raising children, then the marginal
cost of a child is 𝑧𝑤𝐹
𝑡 . If the husband spends time raising children, then the marginal cost
of a child is 𝑧𝑤𝑀
𝑡 . The household’s budget constraint is therefore
𝑤
𝐹













𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑛𝑡 ≥ 1
(4)
where 𝑠𝑡 is the household’s savings. In the third period, the household consumes their savings
𝑐𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)( 5 )
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the net real interest rate on savings.
11Note that since the basic unit is a household which consists a husband and wife, 𝑛𝑡 is, in fact, the number
of pairs of children that a couple has.10
2.3 Optimality
It will prove useful to conduct the analysis in terms of per-household variables. We therefore
deﬁne:
𝑘𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡/𝐿𝑡 𝑚𝑡 = 𝐿
𝑚
𝑡 /𝐿𝑡 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿
𝑝
𝑖,𝑡/𝐿𝑡
as capital, productive mental labor and sectorial physical labor per-household, respectively.
Finally, we deﬁne
𝜅𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡/𝑚𝑡 (6)
as the ratio of capital to mental labor employed in the ﬁrst sector. This ratio will play a
central role in the following analysis.
2.3.1 Firms
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2,𝑡 > 0, (11)
which reﬂects mental and physical labor productivity in the ﬁrst sector, and only physical
labor productivity in the second sector. Similarly, female wage is
𝑤
𝐹
𝑡 = 𝑝1,𝑡(1 − 𝗼)𝑎𝜅
𝗼
𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑛𝑡 < 1, (12)
which reﬂects mental labor productivity in the ﬁrst sector.
2.3.2 Households
Household’s maximizing problem yields
𝑧𝑛𝑡 =
⎧
      ⎨
      ⎩
𝗾(1 + 𝑤𝑀
𝑡 /𝑤𝐹
𝑡 ) 𝑖𝑓 𝗾(1 + 𝑤𝑀
𝑡 /𝑤𝐹
𝑡 ) ≤ 1
2𝗾𝑖 𝑓 2𝗾 ≥ 1
1 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
(13)
Equation (13) implies that in the case in which 𝗾 ≥ 1/2 women raise children full time
regardless of their wages. We rule out this scenario by imposing 𝗾<1/2. Under this
restriction, women raise children full-time only under very high gender wage gaps. But
as the gender gap decreases women join the labor force and fertility decreases. When 𝑤𝐹
𝑡
approaches 𝑤𝑀
𝑡 , women spend a fraction 2𝗾 of their time raising children. Finally, under
𝗾<1/2 the budget constraint (4) collapses to





















The equilibrium of the integrated economy is determined by looking at two regimes sepa-
rately. The ﬁrst is a regime in which women do not participate in the formal labor market,
and the second is a regime in which women participate. To simplify the analysis, we as-
sume that, in equilibrium, the second sector is too small to accommodate all male labor.
Speciﬁcally, we assume12
2 − 𝗼 ≥ 1/𝜃 (16)
to be satisﬁed throughout the following analysis. Under this assumption, 𝐿
𝑝
1,𝑡 > 0 holds and








This ratio determines female labor force participation 1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡 through (15)












To determine equilibrium 𝜅𝑡, combine male wages (10) and (11), prices (7), and the resource















12A suﬃcient condition for 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 > 0 is that the relative price (7)falls short of the ratio of marginal rates of
transformation at 𝑙1,𝑡 =0a n d𝑧𝑛𝑡 = 0 i.e. (1 −𝗼)𝜅𝗼
𝑡 𝑎/𝑏+1> (1 − 𝜃)/𝜃(𝜅𝗼
𝑡 𝑎/𝑏)
1−𝜌.I f𝜅𝗼
𝑡 𝑎/𝑏 ≥ 1 then this
suﬃcient condition is implied by (1 − 𝗼) ≥ (1 − 𝜃)/𝜃,o r( 1 6 ).I f 𝜅𝗼
𝑡 𝑎/𝑏 < 1 instead, the suﬃcient condition
is implied by 1 > (1 − 𝜃)/𝜃and hence, again, by (16).13
Further note that
𝑙1,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 − (1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡) (20)
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1 − 𝑚𝑡 +( 1− 𝑧𝑛𝑡)
)1−𝜌
. (21)
Equations (6), (18), and (21) determine 𝑚𝑡 and 𝑧𝑛𝑡 and thus the equilibrium. There are two
qualitatively diﬀerent types of equilibria to distinguish.
The First Regime 𝑧𝑛𝑡 = 1. In the case in which 𝑧𝑛𝑡 = 1, equation (21) can be written in





















The Second Regime 𝑧𝑛𝑡 < 1. In case in which 𝑧𝑛𝑡 < 1w eu s e𝑚𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡/𝜅𝑡 and 𝑧𝑛𝑡 from










































Equations (22) and (23) determine the equilibrium 𝜅𝑡 in the ﬁrst and second regime, re-
spectively. Notice that expressions on the left of both equations are increasing in 𝜅𝑡, while
both terms on the right are decreasing in 𝜅𝑡.T h i si m p l i e st h a t𝜅𝑡 is unique in both regimes.
Moreover, the expressions on the right of (22) and (23) are increasing in 𝑘𝑡 and we can write
𝜅𝑡(𝑘𝑡) as an increasing function.
This means that, quite intuitively, a capital-rich economy has a higher capital-mental
labor share than a capital scarce economy. When going back to equation (18), this obser-
vation shows also that the higher the capital stock 𝑘𝑡 of an economy, the lower fertility 𝑧𝑛𝑡
is. As 𝜅𝑡(𝑘𝑡)∣𝑘𝑡=0 = 0, (18) further implies that there is a 𝑘𝑜 > 0 so that the economy is in14
the ﬁrst regime when its capital stock falls short of 𝑘𝑜, while the economy is in the second
regime if not. By combining condition 𝗾 (2 + 𝑏/[(1 − 𝗼)𝑎𝜅𝗼
𝑜]) = 1 with equation (22) and
𝜅𝑜 = 𝑘𝑜/𝑚𝑜, this threshold can be shown to be
𝑘𝑜 = 𝜃(1 − 𝗾)
(










At capital stocks below the threshold 𝑘𝑜 all women raise children full-time. When capital
is gradually accumulated and this threshold is passed, women integrate into the labor market
and, as the variable 𝜅𝑡 keeps increasing, the gender wage gap closes and female labor supply
rises. At the same time, and as a mirror image, fertility declines.
These observations regarding the impact of the capital stock on fertility and on female
labor force participation bring us to the dynamics of the model.
2.4.2 Dynamics
The dynamics of the model are governed by two endogenous variables: savings 𝑠𝑡 and fertility
𝑛𝑡. With the notation in per-household terms, the ratio of saving and fertility gives the next
period’s capital stock, i.e. 𝑘𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡/𝑛𝑡. Combining the budget constraint (14) and fertility













𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑡 ≥ 𝑘𝑜.
(25)








𝑡 + 1 (26)15




























































𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑡 ≥ 𝑘𝑜.
(27)
These expressions show that in both regimes, 𝑘𝑡+1 is increasing in 𝜅𝑡 and thus, since 𝜅𝑡 is
an increasing function in 𝑘𝑡, the schedule 𝑘𝑡+1(𝑘𝑡) of the dynamic system is described by an
increasing function.
We can now make two observations, which jointly imply the existence of a steady state
under the second regime. First, the variable 𝜅𝑡 determined by (22) or (23) as well as the
threshold capital stock (24), is independent of 𝑧.T h u s , g i v e n t h a t 𝑧 is suﬃciently large,
an economy with per-household capital stock 𝑘𝑡 = 𝑘𝑜 from (24) experiences positive capital
growth due to capital accumulation (27): its capital stock in period 𝑡+1 exceeds its capital
stock of the previous period, i.e. 𝑘𝑡+1 >𝑘 𝑡 holds. Second, as 𝑘𝑡 grows unbounded, the ratio
𝜅𝑡/𝑘𝑡 =1 /𝑚𝑡 is bounded from above13. Thus, dividing the second line on the right hand side
of equation (27) by 𝑘𝑡 shows that 𝑘𝑡+1/𝑘𝑡 approaches zero as 𝑘𝑡 grows unbounded. Together,
these ﬁndings imply that, if 𝑧 is suﬃciently large, the dynamic system has a steady state in
the second regime.
Our knowledge about the dynamics and the steady state of the system is suﬃcient to
tell a simple story about economic development and female labor force participation. In an
economy where capital is scarce, female labor force participation is zero. As time passes and
per-household capital stock gradually accumulates, the rewards of formal employment for
female workers increase relative to rewards for male workers. This closing of the gender wage
13See Appendix.16
gap fosters female labor force participation and curbs fertility. Both eﬀects accelerate per-
household capital accumulation, which continues under the second regime up to the point
where the economy reaches its steady state.
2.5 International Trade
International trade in goods induces specialization at the country level so that countries
expand some sectors while contracting others. If, as in the current model, sectors diﬀer in
factor intensity, international specialization aﬀects relative factor prices within each country.
In the following paragraphs, we explore these eﬀects of trade, particularly its impact on the
gender wage gap and hence on fertility and female labor force participation.
We assume that the world consists of two countries, Home (no ∗)a n dF o r e i g n( ∗). In
addition, the superscript 𝐴 indicates autarky variables, while its absence indicates variables
of the free trade equilibrium. Moreover, we denote the relative price of the two goods by
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑝2,𝑡/𝑝1,𝑡, the ratio of male to female wage by 𝜔𝑡 = 𝑤𝑀
𝑡 /𝑤𝐹
𝑡 , and the relative population
size of Foreign to Home by 𝜆𝑡 = 𝐿∗
𝑡/𝐿𝑡. Without loss of generality Home will represent the
capital scarce and Foreign the capital abundant country, i.e., we assume that 𝑘𝑡 <𝑘 ∗
𝑡 for the






𝑡) ∣ 𝜆𝑡 ∈ [0,∞]; 𝑘𝑡,𝑘
∗
𝑡 ≥ 0a n d( 𝑘𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡𝑘
∗
𝑡)/(1 + 𝜆𝑡)=¯ 𝑘𝑡
}
, (28)
where ¯ 𝑘𝑡 is the average per household capital stock of the world economy.
2.5.1 Factor Price Equalization














(Remember that the absence of superscript 𝐴 indicates equilibrium variables under free trade
– e.g. at 𝑤𝑀,𝑤 ∗,𝑀 etc.) Among all possible distributions of factors across countries, the
FPES𝑡 comprises those that lead to free trade equilibria characterized by identical factor
prices across countries. In terms of prices and output, these equilibria then replicate the
equilibrium of an integrated world economy where factors are not restricted by national
borders.14 Thus, the FPES𝑡 describes the conditions on factor distributions under which
borders do not aﬀect the world eﬃciency frontier. Loosely conceptualized, a factor allocation
is an element of the FPES𝑡 if relative factors are distributed “not too unevenly”.
The following proposition conveniently characterizes the FPES𝑡 of the present model.
Proposition 1
Under costless trade, the following statement holds: Factor prices equalize ⇔ 𝜅∗
𝑡 = 𝜅𝑡.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition shows that 𝜅𝑡 = 𝜅∗
𝑡 implies 𝜔𝑡 = 𝜔∗
𝑡, a regime in which fertility, deter-
mined by (15), equalizes in both countries: 𝑧𝑛𝑡 = 𝑧𝑛∗










1,𝑡 +1− 𝑧¯ 𝑛𝑡
. (30)
By the deﬁnition of the FPES𝑡,¯ 𝜅𝑡 and ¯ 𝑛𝑡 are also the capital-mental labor ratio and fertility
of the integrated world economy. The constraints 𝑙1,𝑡,𝑙 ∗
2,𝑡 ∈ [0,1] lead to a restriction on
capital stock conditions for factor price equalization:
(1 − 𝑧¯ 𝑛𝑡)¯ 𝜅𝑡 ≤ 𝑘𝑡,𝑘
∗
𝑡 ≤ (2 − 𝑧¯ 𝑛𝑡)¯ 𝜅𝑡 (31)
by the resource constraint. Capital stocks of both countries must add up to the aggregate
world capital stock, i.e., ¯ 𝑘𝑡 =( 𝑘𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡𝑘∗
𝑡)/(1 + 𝜆𝑡). Thus, the FPES𝑡 is described by (31)
14If the equilibrium of the integrated economy is replicated, factors in all countries must equalize. Con-
versely, if factor and good prices equalize in both countries, the world equilibrium is an equilibrium of the
integrated economy.
15Upper bars indicate variables of the integrated economy.18
and
𝑘𝑡 =( 1+𝜆𝑡)¯ 𝑘𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡𝑘
∗
𝑡. (32)
Using the concise graphical representation from Helpman and Krugman (1985), Figure 2
illustrates the FPES𝑡. Each point 𝐴 on the plane represents a partition of world labor and
world capital: the distance between the vertical axis and 𝐴 represents Home’s male labor 𝐿𝑡,
while the distance between the horizontal axis and 𝐴 represents Home’s capital 𝐾𝑡; Foreign’s
variables are 𝐿∗
𝑡 = ¯ 𝐿𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡 and 𝐾∗
𝑡 = ¯ 𝐾𝑡 − 𝐾𝑡, respectively. The upper panel of Figure 2
shows the case 𝑧¯ 𝑛𝑡 < 1, where a minimum amount of capital is required in each country
to keep female labor force productive in the ﬁrst sector. The lower panel shows the case
𝑧¯ 𝑛𝑡 = 1. In this case, a country may entirely lack capital while the world economy is still at
its eﬃciency frontier, replicating the equilibrium of the integrated economy.
We can now readily determine the specialization pattern of both economies under the
assumption that factor prices equalize. Recalling assumption 𝑘𝑡 <𝑘 ∗
𝑡,w eo b s e r v e :
𝑚𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡/¯ 𝜅𝑡 <𝑘
∗




𝑙2,𝑡 =1− [𝑚𝑡 − (1 − 𝑧¯ 𝑛𝑡)] > 1 − [𝑚
∗
𝑡 − (1 − 𝑧¯ 𝑛𝑡)] = 𝑙
∗
2,𝑡.
Conﬁrming Heckscher-Ohlin-based intuition, the capital scarce Home country specializes in
production of the labor intensive good, 𝑋2, while capital abundant Foreign specializes in
𝑋1-production.
We can further compare the trade equilibrium with the respective autarky equilibria:
notice that 1 − 𝑧¯ 𝑛𝑡 ≤ 𝑚𝑡 <𝑚 ∗
𝑡 implies 𝑙∗
1,𝑡 > 0s ot h a t𝜔∗
𝑡 =1+𝑏/(𝑎(1 − 𝗼))¯ 𝜅
−𝗼
𝑡 and (18)
applies for Foreign. As 𝜔∗




𝑡 ≥ 𝑧¯ 𝑛𝑡 ≥ 𝑧𝑛
∗,𝐴
𝑡 .19
These inequalities are strict if 1 >𝑧 𝑛 𝐴
𝑡 holds. Consequently, relative to autarky, trade
increases female labor force participation in the capital scarce country and decreases it in
the capital abundant country.
Both observations combined imply that the country which, by international specializa-
tion, contracts the sector that is particularly suitable for female labor, experiences an increase
in female labor force participation. Conversely, the country which expands the sector suitable
for female labor, experiences a decrease in female labor force participation.
The reason for this seemingly paradoxical ﬁnding is the following. For each economy, the
key determinant of female labor force participation is the wage gap𝜔
(∗)
𝑡 . In autarky and under
factor price equalization, this wage gap is determined by the relative productivities in the
𝑋1-sector via (18) and ultimately by the capital-mental labor ratio 𝜅
(∗)
𝑡 . When international
specialization induces Home to contract its 𝑋1-sector and expand its 𝑋2-sector, male workers
move from the ﬁrst to the second sector, taking their mental labor with them. Thus, they
increase the ratio 𝜅𝑡 and hence female labor force participation (1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡). Conversely, when
Foreign workers react to trade-induced international price shifts and move from the second
to the ﬁrst sector, they dilute the capital-mental labor share 𝜅∗
𝑡, which increases the wage
gap and decreases female labor force participation.16
In sum, under factor price equalization, we get sharp results on the impact of trade on
female labor force participation in the capital scarce and abundant countries, respectively.
The key mechanism for the result described above, however, depends on the fact that the
wage gap is a function of only the capital-mental labor ratio 𝜅
(∗)
𝑡 . It may occur to the reader
that international trade can induce male workers of one country to entirely abandon the
ﬁrst sector, while, at the same time, factor prices and the wage gap in particular do not
equalize in both countries. If this is the case, the one-to-one relationship between 𝜅𝑡 and
16The eﬀect of relative productivities on the gender wage gap, which is the core of our mechanism operates
under substantial generalizations. If 𝐹(𝐾,𝑀,𝐿)represents a standard constant return to scale production
function in the ﬁrst sector, it is suﬃcient to assume that capital 𝐾 complements mental labor 𝑀 relatively
more than physical labor 𝐿 (i.e. , 𝐹𝐾𝑀/𝐹𝑀 >𝐹 𝐾𝐿/𝐹𝐿 ≥ 0, in line with Goldin (1990)) in order to
generate the eﬀect discussed. In particular, under these conditions, higher male employment in the ﬁrst
sector increases the gender wage gap.20
𝑧𝑛𝑡 described by (18) does not hold and the mechanism described above ceases to apply.
Consequently, our results under factor price equalization cannot be expected to hold under
each and every factor distribution (𝜆𝑡,𝑘 𝑡,𝑘 ∗
𝑡) ∈FD𝑡. The extent to which they generalize
beyond factor price equalization is the subject of the next subsection.
2.5.2 Beyond Factor Price Equalization
Let us begin the general case of international trade by focusing on one country, for example,
Home, with exogenous relative world prices 𝜋𝑡 – i.e., assume, for the moment, Home to be a
small open economy. For this exercise, we abandon Home’s role as the capital scarce country.
When world prices coincide with Home’s autarky price 𝜋𝐴
𝑡 ,w eh a v e𝑙1,𝑡,𝑙 2,𝑡 > 0, as argued












𝑡 + 1 (34)
hold for 𝜋𝑡 in a small neighborhood of 𝜋𝐴
𝑡 . Combine (33) and (34) to verify that in this





is decreasing in 𝜋𝑡 and 𝑧𝑛𝑡 is also decreasing by (15). Since 𝜅𝑡 is increasing in 𝜋𝑡 by (34),
𝑚𝑡 = 𝑙1,𝑡 +1−𝑧𝑛𝑡 must be decreasing in 𝜋𝑡, which ﬁnally means that 𝑙1,𝑡 is decreasing in 𝜋𝑡.
These relations hold as long as 𝑙1,𝑡,𝑙 2,𝑡 > 0 apply. Thus, by the constraints 𝑙1,𝑡 ∈ [0,1], there
are thresholds 𝜋 and ¯ 𝜋 with 𝜋 <𝜋 𝐴
𝑡 < ¯ 𝜋 so that for 𝜋𝑡 <𝜋 ,w eh a v e𝑙1,𝑡 =1a n d𝜅𝑡 as well
as the wage gap 𝜔𝑡 deﬁned by (17) are constant. Conversely, for 𝜋𝑡 > ¯ 𝜋,w eh a v e𝑙1,𝑡 =0i n
which case (33) holds and 𝜅𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡/(1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡) and (15) imply:
𝜔𝑡







This equation deﬁnes 𝜔𝑡 as an increasing function of 𝜋𝑡. Finally, at 𝜋𝑡 →∞equation (36)
implies 𝜔𝑡 → (1 − 𝗾)/𝗾.
Figure 3 summarizes these ﬁndings of the function 𝜔𝑡 (𝜋𝑡). For small 𝜋𝑡, the wage gap 𝜔𝑡
is constant. For the intermediate range 𝜋𝑡 ∈ (𝜋, ¯ 𝜋), the wage gap 𝜔𝑡 (𝜋𝑡) is decreasing but
for 𝜋𝑡 > ¯ 𝜋 it is increasing. By the generic relation (15), these swings in 𝜔𝑡 are paralleled by
swings in 𝑧𝑛𝑡.
Now consider the Home economy facing relative world prices 𝜋𝑡 <𝜋 𝐴
𝑡 . This means that,
relative to autarky, the wage gap 𝜔𝑡 increases and, hence, fertility 𝑛𝑡 rises while female labor
participation (1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡) drops. At the same time trade expands the 𝑋1-sector and contracts
the 𝑋2-sector.17 If, instead, 𝜋𝑡 >𝜋 𝐴
𝑡 , there are two possible outcomes. First, if 𝜋𝑡 is not too
large, then the eﬀect of trade is a reduction in the wage gap 𝜔𝑡 and thus a decrease in fertility
𝑛𝑡 and an increase in female labor force participation (1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡). Second, if 𝜋𝑡 is suﬃciently
large, then trade induces an increase in 𝜔𝑡 and 𝑛𝑡 and a decrease in (1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡). In Figure 3,
the threshold that separates the two cases is labeled 𝜋𝑢. In either case, trade contracts the
𝑋1-sector and expands the 𝑋2-sector.18
Now, return to the trade equilibrium between capital scarce Home and capital abundant
Foreign. The autarky prices of both countries satisfy (34), implying 𝜋𝐴
𝑡 <𝜋
∗,𝐴
𝑡 , while the
world price under free trade 𝜋𝑡 must lie between the respective autarky prices:
𝜋
𝐴
𝑡 ≤ 𝜋𝑡 ≤ 𝜋
∗,𝐴
𝑡 . (37)
Thus, trade (weakly) increases relative prices 𝜋𝑡 in Home while it (weakly) decreases them in
Foreign. With this observation, we can apply the insights of the analysis above. For capital
17To see this, notice that 𝜋𝑡 <𝜋 𝐴
𝑡 implies 𝑙1,𝑡 >𝑙 𝐴
1,𝑡 and, as (34)holds, 𝜅𝑡 <𝜅 𝐴
𝑡 . This, in turn leads to
𝑚𝑡 >𝑚 𝐴
𝑡 so that total output in the ﬁrst sector 𝑎𝑘𝗼
𝑡 𝑚
1−𝗼
𝑡 + 𝑏𝑙1,𝑡 rises relative to autarky. Output of the
second sector 𝑏(1 − 𝑙1,𝑡)drops.
18Observe that 𝜋𝑡 >𝜋 𝐴
𝑡 implies 𝑙1,𝑡 <𝑙 𝐴
1,𝑡 so output in the second sector 𝑏(1 −𝑙1,𝑡)expands in both cases.
Further, for 𝜋𝑡 < ¯ 𝜋 (34)holds, implying 𝜅𝑡 >𝜅 𝐴
𝑡 or 𝑚𝑡 <𝑚 𝐴
𝑡 . Any increase in 𝜋𝑡 above ¯ 𝜋 reduces female
labor 1−𝑧𝑛𝑡 while 𝑙1,𝑡 = 0 continues to hold. Thus, 𝑚𝑡 <𝑚 𝐴
𝑡 in this range, too. Together, this means that
output in the ﬁrst sector 𝑎𝑘𝗼
𝑡 𝑚
1−𝗼
𝑡 + 𝑏𝑙1,𝑡 falls.22
abundant Foreign, trade unambiguously causes a (weak) increase in the wage gap 𝜔𝑡 and
thus a drop in female labor force participation. We can therefore generalize the ﬁrst part
of our result derived under factor price equalization. The country which, by international
specialization, expands the sector suitable for female employment experiences a decrease in
female labor force participation.
For capital scarce Home, however, trade induces a decrease in the wage gap 𝜔𝑡 and an
increase in female labor force participation if and only if 𝜋𝑡 is not too high (i.e., 𝜋𝑡 ≤ 𝜋𝑢 holds).
In this restricted case, we recover the second part of the result derived under factor price
equalization. The country which contracts the sector suitable for female labor experiences
an increase in female labor force participation.
This second observation is a non-trivial generalization of the parallel result under factor
price equalization. To verify this statement, use that under free trade 𝑙∗
1,𝑡 > 0a n d𝑙2,𝑡 > 0












𝑡 + 1 (38)
holds. Proposition 1, however, states that factor price equalization requires 𝜅𝑡 = 𝜅∗
𝑡, implying
𝜋𝑡 =( 1− 𝗼) 𝑎
𝑏𝜅𝗼
𝑡 +1. By construction of ¯ 𝜋, however, all world equilibria with 𝜋𝑡 ∈ (¯ 𝜋,𝜋𝑢)a r e
characterized by equality 𝜋𝑡 > (1 − 𝗼) 𝑎
𝑏𝜅𝗼
𝑡 + 1, implying that factor prices do not equalize.
Since ﬁnally, by construction of 𝜋𝑢 we have 𝜔𝑡 >𝜔 𝐴
𝑡 for all equilibria with 𝜋𝑡 ∈ (¯ 𝜋,𝜋𝑢)w e
conclude that trade induces an increase of female labor force participation in Home for a set
of factor endowments that is strictly larger than the 𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑆 𝑡.
Summarizing, we use the deﬁnitions (28) and (29) to state the following proposition.
Proposition 2
(i) In Foreign, trade expands the sector that uses female labor intensively, but unambigu-
ously reduces female labor force participation.
(ii) There is a set 𝑆𝑡 ⊂FD𝑡 with FPES𝑡 ⫋ 𝑆𝑡 and the following property: for each element23
of 𝑆𝑡 trade contracts the sector that uses female labor intensively in Home, but increases
Home’s female labor force participation.
2.5.3 Dynamics under Trade
The dynamics of the model under free trade are again driven by two key variables, savings
𝑠𝑡 and fertility 𝑛𝑡. Per-household capital stocks of either country follow the generic dynamic




















To calculate the respective wages (10) - (12), we can use the ﬁnal good normalization (8)






























(iii) If 𝗼(𝜃/(1 − 𝜃))
−1








Proposition 3 (i) and (ii) show that trade cannot reverse the order of countries regarding
population growth or capital abundance. The capital rich country has always weakly lower
fertility rates, higher female labor force participation and faster pace of per-household capital
accumulation.24
Proposition 3 (iii) shows that, given that the ﬁrst sector is suﬃciently large (i.e., 1 − 𝜃
is suﬃciently small), trade unambiguously accelerates the pace of capital accumulation in
the capital scarce country. It is worth emphasizing that this result also holds in the case
where world prices 𝜋𝑡 are very large and all men in Home work in the 𝑋2-sector while female
labor participation drops relative to autarky (𝜋𝑡 >𝜋 𝑢 in Figure 3). Even in this case,
where a reduced female labor force participation depresses savings and increased population
growth dilutes the following period’s per household capital stock, the gains from trade are
suﬃcient to grant a net increase in per-household capital accumulation relative to autarky.
We cannot, however, make a parallel statement for the capital rich economy, for which the
eﬀect of trade on capital accumulation is ambiguous. Indeed, it can be shown that for
capital accumulation in the rich economy, the positive forces stemming from the gains of
trade might either dominate or be dominated by the adverse eﬀect of reduced female labor
force participation and higher fertility.
Finally, Proposition 3 (iv) makes a relative statement about the countries’ capital accu-
mulation. Trade cannot accelerate capital accumulation in the rich country by more than
it accelerates it in the poor country. In particular, the proposition shows that trade spurs
convergence of per-household capital stocks. At the same time, using Proposition 3 (ii) and









𝑡 = ˜ 𝑘.
Since in the limit, factor endowments between countries equalize, the motives to trade dis-
appear. Consequently, the limit ˜ 𝑘 is equal to the limit of the closed economy: ˜ 𝑘 = 𝑘,w h e r e
𝑘 is the steady state capital stock of the closed economy.
Summarizing Proposition 3, international trade fosters convergence in fertility, labor force
participation, and per-household capital stocks.25
2.6 Technological Progress
The reduction in the gender wage gap is often attributed to technological change. Thus,
Welch (2000), Gosling (2003) and Black and Spitz-Oener (2007) argue that the increase in
the market price for women’s labor was brought about by a relative increase in the valuation
of skill (mental labor endowments), which is, at least in part, explained by technological
change. Galor and Weil (1996) show how technological change can eliminate poverty traps,
characterized by high fertility, low female labor force participation and low per-household
capital stocks. They argue that “technological progress will eventually eliminate such a
development trap, leading to a period of rapid output growth and a rapid fertility transition”
(p. 383).
Another popular hypothesis rests on demand shifts in favor of goods whose production
is more intensive in skill or, more generally, in female labor inputs. The mechanism outlined
above, in which, male workers searching for the highest return to their labor crowd out women
in the labor market sheds some doubt on the generality of these pro-growth eﬀects. Indeed,
we show next that the eﬀect that leads to a decrease in female labor force participation and
an increase in fertility in response to the expansion of the females’ comparative advantage
sector operates under technological change and shifts in demand as well.
For the formal analysis of technological change and demand shifts, we return to the closed
economy. To incorporate technological change biased towards the sectors that generate













so that growth of the parameter 𝜇 ≥ 1 mimics technological progress that is biased towards26













































While the right hand side of (42) is decreasing in 𝜅𝑡, the left hand side of (42) is increasing in
𝜅𝑡 and in 𝜇,f o r𝜌 ∈ (0,1). This implies that an increase in 𝜇 decreases the equilibrium level
of 𝜅𝑡, which, in turn, decreases female’s productivity relative to male productivity, widens
the gender wage gap and curbs female labor force participation.
After reading the previous subsections, the intuition for this result is straightforward.
An increase in 𝜇 increases male productivity in the ﬁrst sector relative to the second sector.
As long as the elasticity of substitution between 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 is greater than one, the relative
price 𝜋 decreases but the decrease is less than the increase in 𝜇. As a result, male wage
increases in the ﬁrst sector, inducing male workers to move from the second sector to the
ﬁrst sector. This increases mental labor employed in the ﬁrst sector and dilutes 𝜅 so that
women’s relative productivity declines, driving women out of formal employment into the
child-rearing.
A similar mechanism applies under demand shifts towards the ﬁrst good, equivalent to
an increase in the parameter 𝜃 (compare (1)). Again, equation (42) shows that an increase
in 𝜃 is followed by a decrease in 𝜅𝑡, which curbs women’s productivity by more than men’s,
widens the wage gap and thus decreases female labor force participation while fostering
fertility.
Thus, our model shows that neither a technological change biased towards sectors with
a high demand for female labor nor demand shift towards goods of these sectors necessarily
generates increases in female labor participation. The resulting increase in fertility generally
counters the pro-growth eﬀects.
19Under 𝜇 ≥ 1 condition (16)is suﬃcient for 𝑙
𝑝
1,𝑡 > 0 to hold, i.e., male employment in the ﬁrst sector is
positive.27
3 Empirical Evidence
Our theory predicts an asymmetric impact of trade liberalization on the labor markets of
capital rich and capital scarce economies: while trade lowers female labor force participation
in the former, it tends to increase it in the latter. We like to think of our theory in the context
of long run growth and frame it with a model of demographic transition. In light of data
limitations, however, we choose to test the predictions through the surge in U.S.-Mexican
trade during the period 1990–2007, a period of trade liberalization, which we simply label
the “NAFTA episode” in the following20.
The choice of the NAFTA episode has a number of virtues. First, the U.S. and Mexico
are paradigmatic for a pair of capital rich and capital poor economies, for which our theory
applies.21 As a second advantage of the NAFTA episode, U.S.-Mexican trade experienced
a substantial growth during that period: U.S. trade with Mexico as a share of U.S. GDP
increased by more than a factor of 3 between 1990 and 2007, while Mexico’s share in U.S.
total trade rose by more than a factor of 2 (Figure 4). Via this substantial increase of
bilateral trade volumes we hope to identify a sizable impact of trade on labor markets.
Third, the choice of the NAFTA episode allows us to take advantage of the high quality
of U.S. trade and labor market data. In particular, we can exploit exposure to trade with
Mexico on a U.S. state level. Finally, due to the speciﬁc geographical constellation, U.S.
trade with Mexico is particularly uneven across U.S. states, which allows us to use distance
as a powerful instrument for a change in trade volumes and thus establish causality running
from change in trade to change in female labor share.
20This label is misleading to the extent that not all of the increase in US-Mexican trade is attributed to
tariﬀ reductions of NAFTA. In fact, Krueger (1999)puts forward that Mexico’s unilateral tariﬀ reduction
in the late 1980s and its abandoning of the exchange rate peg explains the larger part of the increase in
trade volumes. For the purpose of our test, however, this observation is of minor importance. We are only
concerned about identifying an episode of substantial increase in trade volumes.
21Capital stocks per worker can be calculated from real investment data as in PWT6.2. At depreciation
rates between .01 and .1, the relative capital stock of the U.S. in 2003 exceeds the one of Mexico by a factor
of four. Consistent with our theory, the female labor share in the U.S. ranged from 43.1 to 46.3 between
1985 and 2006 while the according range for Mexico is 29.4 to 35.3 (United Nations Statistics Division).28
3.1 Data
We rely on three diﬀerent data sources. First, we use data from the March Current Popula-
tion Survey conducted by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-CPS).22 From
(IPUMS-CPS) we take the variables age, sex, marital status, population status (to distin-
guish between civilian or Armed Forces), nativity (to identify immigrants), location (state),
Hispanic origin (to identify Mexicans), educational attainment, employment status (to com-
pute the formal employment share) weeks worked and usual hours worked (to compute total
hours worked). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for female and male labor for the years
1990/91 and 2006/07. As is visible in Table 1, while female labor force participation has
increased, male labor force participation has decreased during the NAFTA episode. Second,
we use the ”Origin of Movement” database administered by WISER,23 which covers export
data by state and destination country from 1988 onward. These data are disaggregated by
good categories (SIT2 from 1988 to 2000; NAICS from 1997 onward). Third, we use the
Bureau of Economic Analysis for GDP by state data.24
3.2 The Empirical Model
In our empirical exercise we concentrate on one side of our theory and aim at identifying
the eﬀect of trade on the U.S. labor market (the capital rich economy). More precisely,
we exploit the variation of U.S.-Mexican trade across diﬀerent U.S. states to identify the
diﬀerential impact of trade on female labor share across states.25According to our theory,
a higher exposure to trade with Mexico induces lower female labor force participation in
22King, Ruggles, Alexander, Leicach and Sobek (2009).
23World Institute for Strategic Economic Research; data available under http://www.wisertrade.org.
Cassey (2006)gives a good introduction to the data and their limitations.
24data available under http: http://bea.doc.gov/regional/.
25The focus on U.S. states as economic entities may seem problematic since state borders are not relevant
restrictions for the labor. This drawback, however, implies that inter-state labor migration can eliminate
diﬀerences in the wage gap and female labor force participation across states, which tends to eliminate the
diﬀerential eﬀects of trade across states. Thus, no diﬀerential eﬀect of trade on female labor shares across
states can be expected as long as the U.S. labor market works frictionless. We nevertheless expect to capture
labor markets eﬀects to the extent that frictions of labor movement related to geographical distance impede
a full equalization of factor prices across U.S. states.29
the diﬀerent U.S. states. Analyzing this relation on the state level, our reduced form model
takes the following form
𝑦𝑠𝑡 = 𝗿𝑠 + 𝗼𝑡 + 𝗽𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋
′
𝑠𝑡𝗾 + 𝑢𝑠𝑡 (43)
where 𝑠 indicates U.S. states and 𝑡 periods. The dependent variable 𝑦𝑠𝑡 is the female labor
share, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑡 is trade volume per output and 𝗿𝑠 denotes a full set of state dummies. Apart
form a time-trend we control for a vector of covariates 𝑋′
𝑠𝑡 chosen by economic intuition but
unrelated to our theoretical model. Our initial period is 1990-1, denoted by 𝑡 = 0, while the
end period is 2006-7, denoted by 𝑡 =1 . 26
Taking diﬀerences eliminates the state ﬁxed eﬀects and the empirical model (43) becomes
Δ𝑦𝑠 = 𝗼 + 𝗽Δ𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑠 +Δ 𝑋
′
𝑠𝗾 + 𝑢𝑠1 − 𝑢𝑠0 (44)
where for any variable 𝑧𝑠𝑡 the notation Δ𝑧𝑠 indicates the change over time (Δ𝑧𝑠 = 𝑧𝑠1−𝑧𝑠0).
Our theory predicts that the estimate of 𝗽 in (44) is negative.
Concerned with the possibility that labor market conditions in the U.S. can constitute a
form of comparative advantage and thus drive trade volumes, we slightly modify the gravity
equation of the trade literature and instrument 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑡 by distance to Mexico.27 Thus, our
ﬁrst stage regression is:
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑡 = 𝜚𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡+ 𝜃𝑑 𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋
′
𝑠𝑡 𝜌 + 𝜈𝑠𝑡 (45)
where 𝜚𝑠 denotes a full set of state dummies and 𝑑𝑠 is distance of state 𝑠 to Mexico. By
26This time window is determined by availability of trade data. The data set includes entries for the years
1988/89 but these are of minor quality.
27More precisely, we regress trade volume as a percentage of GSP on spherical distance of U.S. state-
capitals to Mexico City, while the standard gravity equation estimates the log of bilateral trade volume on
the log of GDP, spherical distance and other variables. Our justiﬁcation is the ﬁt of the data. For a more
elaborate and elegant way for instrumenting trade with distance see Feyrer (2009).30
taking diﬀerences our ﬁrst stage regression becomes:
Δ𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑠 = 𝜇 + 𝜃𝑑 𝑠 +Δ 𝑋
′
𝑠 𝜌 + 𝜈𝑠1 − 𝜈𝑠0 (46)
Figure 5 illustrates that distance is strongly correlated with the increase in trade share,
satisfying a ﬁrst necessary condition for being a valid instrument.28
3.3 Control Variables
To control for diﬀerential business cycle eﬀects across states we include log per capita “Gross
State Product” (GSP) and the unemployment rate. We also control for average education
level for females, which is positively correlated with female labor share.29 Further, we include
the share of Mexican immigrants, which might either depress female labor participation – e.g.
due to cultural diﬀerences reducing gender labor market participations30 – or else increase
female labor participation – e.g. by increasing supply of nannies and private child-care. We
have no strong prior on the sign of this latter control variable.
The secular trend towards higher female labor force participation together with the fact
that it is naturally bounded from above implies that female labor force participation con-
28By our identifying assumption, distance to Mexico does not impact the change in female labor shares
across U.S. states through other channels than bilateral trade. To lend support to this assumption we
examine the quality of distance as an instrument by comparing its explanatory power for the change in
female labor force participation in two diﬀerent periods: ﬁrst, 1990–2000, in which we observe a substantial
increase in U.S.-Mexican trade; and second, 1960–1970, in which U.S.-Mexican trade was stagnant, which
we simply label the “pre-NAFTA episode” (Figure 4). To this end, we employ the 1 percent Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA)of the decennial censuses data (Ruggles, Sobek, Alexander,
Fitch, Goeken, Kelly Hall, King and Ronnander (2009)). This source provides us with employment data for
men and women for the years 1950, 1960 and 1970 for the pre-NAFTA period, and 1980, 1990 and 2000 for
the NAFTA period. Table A-1 (see Appendix)summa rizes these reduced form regressions of female labor
force participation directly on distance in the two episodes and shows that during the NAFTA period the
coeﬃcient of distance is positive and signiﬁcant while in the pre-NAFTA period is negative and sometimes
insigniﬁcant, which is consistent with our story.
29We deﬁne two categories of education. First, educated individuals who have at least some college and
for whom we assign a weight of 1. Second, uneducated individuals who are at most high school graduates
and for whom we assign a weight of 0. The education level of a state is deﬁned as the average of individual
weights.
30On a national level, this concern seems unsubstantiated: national averages of female hours worked as
percentage of male hours worked of Mexicans exceed the according numbers of the full sample by 0.5% to
1.9% between 1990 and 2007.31
verges across states. Hence, the initial levels of female labor share is highly correlated with its
changes. To account for this convergence eﬀect, we include initial level of female labor force
participation in the controls when estimating (44). A problem with this control variable,
however, is that it is correlated with the error term 𝑢𝑖1 − 𝑢𝑖2 in (44) through equation (43),
wherefore we instrument it with lagged female labor participation (values from 1980/81).
3.4 Regression Results
For our baseline speciﬁcation we deﬁne female labor participation as the share of hours
worked by females. Taking this share is not a strict necessity but it eliminates labor market
shocks that are common to both sexes. In all our speciﬁcations labor force is deﬁned as
the total of individuals aged between 16 and 65, excluding members of the Armed Forces.
We further deﬁne exposure to trade as twice the state exports to Mexico over GSP. The
restriction to exports is due to the fact that import data per state are not available.31
Distance is spherical distance from state-capitals to Mexico City.
Table 2 reports the results of our baseline regression. Column 1 reports a simple OLS
regression of our dependent variable: change in female labor share on an initial level of
female labor share, which we take it to be the average of 1980 and 1981 and the change in
trade with Mexico. Our focus, however, lies on the remaining ﬁve columns that summarize IV
estimates, where the change in trade is instrumented by distance. Column 2 reports estimates
without controls, column 3 includes average female labor share of 1990 and 1991, which is
instrumented by the average values of 1980 and 1981; column 4 includes the diﬀerences of log
per capita GSP and unemployment share; column 5 includes diﬀerences in female education
share and column 6 includes change in Mexican immigration share.
The coeﬃcient of our interest is the one on change in trade with Mexico (𝗽). All of its
estimates have the expected negative sign and are signiﬁcant on the one percent conﬁdence
level. Column 3, indicates that a one percent increase in trade share with Mexico (as
31We assume that import equalizes export in order to reveal, quantitatively, a more realistic coeﬃcient of
trade on female labor share.32
experienced by Arizona) decreases the female relative to male labor share by around 1.5
percent. The coeﬃcient on the initial level of female labor share is negative and signiﬁcant,
as predicted by convergence forces.32
3.5 Robustness
We next conduct some robustness check for the results obtained in the baseline regression
(column 3 in Table 2). First, we exclude Texas as well as Alaska and Hawaii from the
sample since these states appear to be outliers in terms of distance (see Figure 5), and hence
in predicted trade shares. Table 3 summarizes the corresponding results in the ﬁrst three
columns. The exclusions do not aﬀect the general picture: the impact of trade share with
Mexico remains negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level (5% in column 3).
We are also concerned about our deﬁnition of trade shares, since Cassey (2006) reports
that export data exhibit systematic diﬀerences between “origin of movement deﬁnition” and
“origin of production.” Since these errors are substantial in the agricultural and mining
sectors only, we replace total export over GSP per state by the according manufacturing
export percentages. Column 4 in Table 3 shows that our concerns are unsubstantiated: the
estimates are still signiﬁcant at the 1% level and estimated magnitudes are very similar.
In trade literature the standard measure for distance is the spherical one (spherical dis-
tance between capitals). We check whether our results depend on the choice of distance and
replace it by ground distance to the Mexican border (column 5 in Table 3).33 Results show
that neither the point estimates nor the signiﬁcance level are aﬀected.
Since our theory rests on the within household optimization, it seems appropriate to
restrict our sample to married individuals only. Column 6 in Table 3 shows that the point
estimates and the signiﬁcance remain in the same range (5% level).
Next we replace the deﬁnition of our dependent variable from share of hours to relative
32Table 2 shows that the OLS estimate is larger than IV estimate. One possible interpretation from this
diﬀerence, which is consistent with our theory is that higher female labor force participation induces a higher
relative advantage in the capital intensive sector which implies higher international specialization and trade.
33Ground distance is measured in time and derived from maps.google.com.33
employment. This obviously eliminates the important intensive margin of individuals’ labor
market participation. Column 7 in Table 3 shows that the estimates are signiﬁcant at the
5% level.
Our theory suggests that trade-induced specialization reduces female labor force partic-
ipation in capital rich country while making male workers merely change sectors. Conse-
quently, we need to check that our results above are driven by changes in female employment
only. We do so by investigating the impact of trade on female and male working hours sep-
arately. Average female hours per week are 22.77 (standard deviation across states is 1.92)
in 1990/1991 and 24.24 (1.84) in 2006/2007. The according numbers for male are 32.92
(1.89) and 32.2 (1.81), respectively (Table 1). These regressions are summarized in Table
A-2.34 While all point estimates of the coeﬃcient on change in trade share with Mexico are
negative and signiﬁcant for females, trade, overall, does not signiﬁcantly impact male hours:
estimates are insigniﬁcant, positive and around zero.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes how expansions and contractions of sectors that use female labor inten-
sively aﬀect aggregate female labor force participation. We argue that when international
trade expands sectors conductive to female employment, female labor force participation
drops and vice versa. This is because male workers earn higher wages than women and
are therefore always formally employed. Thus, when an economy specializes in sectors in-
tensively use female labor, other sectors contract and male workers move to the expanding
sectors, driving female workers out of formal employment.
Interestingly, Our mechanism also applies in the case of technological progress, which
is biased towards female labor. In particular, technological progress biased towards FRAS
increases the wages in this sector. This increase in wages attracts male workers who leave the
34Column 2, 4, 6 and 8 in Table A-2 show that using population weight to unravel the impact of change in
trade at the individual level does not change neither the magnitudes of our estimates nor their signiﬁcance.34
MRAS, an eﬀect that can be strong enough to drive female workers out of formal employment.
In this way, technological progress biased towards female labor might curb female labor force
participation.
Turning to the dynamics, our model suggests that international trade fosters per-household
capital growth in the capital scarce economy. In the capital abundant economy, however,
the impact of international trade on capital growth is ambiguous. Although international
trade hinders female labor force participation and increases fertility, domination of these
adverse eﬀects by positive forces stemming from gains from trade may occur. In both cases,
our model suggests that trade cannot accelerate capital accumulation in the rich country
by more than it accelerates capital accumulation in the poor country and, thus, our theory
predicts convergence of per-household capital stocks.
Finally, we test our theory using bilateral trade data for the U.S. and Mexico. We ex-
ploit U.S. cross-state variation in the exposure to trade with Mexico to examine how trade
has impacted female labor force participation. Instrumenting trade shares with geographic
distance, our cross-state regressions support the hypothesis that, in rich economies, inter-
national trade with poor countries tends to reduce female labor supply. These ﬁndings are
robust to various deﬁnitions of female labor supply and a set of controls.
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Figure 1: Relative Wages, United States 1800-1990. Source: Galor (2005).
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Figure 3: Wage Gap and World Price
Figure 4: U.S. Trade Share – Imports plus Exports over GDP – with Mexico (red line, right
scale) and Mexico’s Share of U.S. Trade Volumes (blue line, left scale). Source: (1) Nominal
GDP: are from Heston et al. (2006) and (2) US imports from and export to Mexico are from
Feenstra et al. (2005) for the period 1962 - 2000 and from United States International Trade


































































































































































Figure 5: Change in Trade with Mexico by State (1990-2007). left Panel: all states; right
panel: excluding Alaska, Hawaii and Texas.43













































NOTE.-Gross state standard deviations are in paren-
theses. Data for education, labor participation and
Mexican immigrants are from IPUMS-CPS, data for
trade are from World Institute for Strategic Economic
Research and data for Gross State Product are from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. State Education
rate is measured by the share of civilians aged 16–
65 that have, at least, some college. Employment is
the share of the working group out of the population
aged 16–65. Per capita Gross State Product data are
chained 2000 dollars. Trade share data are calculated
as two fold export volumes over GSP. Census sample



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Proof that 1/𝑚𝑡 is bounded above. First observe that 𝑘𝑡 →∞means 𝑘𝑡 >𝑘 𝑜 so
that the second regime applies. Use (23) to conﬁrm that 𝜅𝑡 →∞as 𝑘𝑡 →∞(else the
denominator in the brackets of the expression on the right turns negative). Finally, divide









𝑏𝑚𝑡 +[ 𝑚𝑡 − (1 − 𝑧𝑛𝑡)]𝜅
−𝗼
𝑡
1 − 𝑚𝑡 +( 1− 𝑧𝑛𝑡)
)1−𝜌




Since this limit is positive, the term in brackets must approach inﬁnity as 𝑘𝑡 →∞so that,
as lim𝜅𝑡→∞ 𝑧𝑛𝑡 =2 𝗾, lim𝑘𝑡→∞ 𝑚𝑡 =2 ( 1− 𝗾) must hold. This proves that 1/𝑚𝑡 is bounded
above.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of ”⇒” is immediate by 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟∗
𝑡 and (9).
For ”⇐” assume that 𝜅∗







𝑡 = 𝑝1,𝑡(1 − 𝗼)𝑎𝜅𝗼




𝑡 .B y𝑋2,𝑡 > 0w eh a v e𝑙2,𝑡 + 𝑙∗
2,𝑡 > 0. In case
𝑙∗
2,𝑡,𝑙 2,𝑡 > 0 𝑤𝑀
𝑡 = 𝑤
𝑀,∗
𝑡 follows from (10). In case 𝑙∗
2,𝑡 = 0 this implies
𝑤
𝑀
𝑡 = 𝑝2,𝑡𝑏 ≤ 𝑤
𝑀,∗
𝑡 .
A tt h es a m et i m e𝑙∗
1,𝑡 = 1 implies
𝑤
𝑀,∗
𝑡 = 𝑝1,𝑡((1 − 𝗼)𝑎(𝜅
∗
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Proof of Proposition 3. (i) By (15) it is suﬃcient to show 𝜔∗
𝑡 ≤ 𝜔𝑡. Since free trade
implies 𝑙∗
1,𝑡 > 0a n d𝑙2,𝑡 > 0w eh a v e𝜔𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡𝑏/[𝑎(1 − 𝗼)𝜅𝗼
𝑡 ] ≥ 1+𝑏/[𝑎(1 − 𝗼)𝜅𝗼
𝑡 ]a n d
𝜔∗
𝑡 =1+𝑏/[𝑎(1 − 𝗼)(𝜅∗
𝑡)
𝗼] ≥ 𝜋𝑡𝑏/[𝑎(1 − 𝗼)(𝜅∗
𝑡)








and proves statement (i).
(ii) By (i) and (15) we have 𝑧𝑛∗
𝑡 ≤ 𝑧𝑛𝑡 and can distinguish two cases. The ﬁrst where










If instead 𝑧𝑛𝑡 < 1 (i) implies 𝑧𝑛∗














where we used (i) in the ﬁrst inequality and the second inequality follows as above.
(iii) If 𝑧𝑛𝐴
























For the case 𝜔𝑡 ≤ 𝜔𝐴
𝑡 (or 𝜋𝑡 ≤ 𝜋𝑢 in Figure 3) this proves the claim. If instead 𝜔𝑡 >𝜔 𝐴
𝑡 we




































































































Since 𝜔𝑡 > 1a n d𝜋𝑡 > 1 this condition is satisﬁed whenever
𝗼
𝗾








or (𝜃/(1 − 𝜃))
1
1−𝜌 ≥ (1 − 2𝗾)/(𝗼𝗾) holds, proving the statement (iii).
(iv) Notice with Proposition 2 (i) that 𝑧𝑛∗










𝑡 =1 ,i n s t e a d ,𝑘∗
𝑡+1/𝑘
∗,𝐴





𝑡 +𝑏)). Now, inequality




























𝑡 )𝗼) while for 𝑧𝑛𝑡 =1
𝑘𝑡+1/𝑘𝐴
𝑡+1 = 𝑝1,𝑡 ((1 − 𝗼)𝑎𝜅𝗼
𝑡 + 𝑏)/(𝑝𝐴
1,𝑡((1 − 𝗼)𝑎(𝜅𝐴
𝑡 )𝗼 + 𝑏)) holds. By (37) and expression
(40) we have 𝑝1,𝑡/𝑝𝐴
1,𝑡 ≥ 1. Further, by 𝑚𝐴
𝑡 ≥ 𝑚𝑡 we have 𝜅𝐴






































𝑡 ≥ 𝑚𝑡 shows that the expression on the right falls weakly
short of unitiy, which proves the statement.50
Table A-1: Explanatory Power of Distance on Female Labor Force Participation







































Number of obs 42 51 42 51
NOTE.-Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are reported in paren-
theses. In all regressions the variable Female Labor Force Participation is regressed on
distance and the initial level of FLFP. The dependent variables, relative employment
described in columns 3 & 4 is the ratio of females employment over males employment.
The initial level of FLFP is instrumented by its lagged level. The before NAFTA pe-
riod is 1960–1970 and the during NAFTA period is 1990–2000. Lagged levels are 1950
and 1980, respectively. For the before NAFTA period part of the data are missing
for 9 states, which are Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming. restricting our during NAFTA period regres-
sions to the same 42 states does not aﬀect neither the magnitudes of coeﬃcients nor
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